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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1123
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES WALTER DAVIDSON, Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cr-00495-001)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 17, 2012
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 18, 2012)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
In 1995, a federal jury found Davidson guilty of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a playground in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860.
In light of his criminal history, he was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of

the Sentencing Guidelines. Under that section, his offense level was 34, which was
higher than his offense level would have been based on his crimes relating to cocaine
base (“crack cocaine”). The District Court sentenced him within the guidelines of 262
months to 327 months to 264 months of imprisonment (plus a fine of $2000, eight years
of supervised release, and $100 special assessment). Davidson appealed. We affirmed
the District Court’s judgment.
In addition to other challenges to the judgment, in 2008, Davidson filed a pro se
motion for a two-level reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
District Court appointed counsel, who argued that Davidson’s sentence should be reduced
because of the retroactively applied Amendment 706 (which lowered the base offense
levels for crack cocaine offenses under § 2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines by two
levels). The District Court denied Davidson’s motion, citing United States v. Mateo, 560
F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009). In Mateo, we explained that Amendment 706 has no effect on
the application of the career offender offense level under § 4B1.1, and a career offender
cannot seek a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 706. 560
F.3d at 155. On appeal, Davidson, through counsel, acknowledged that Mateo barred his
claim but sought to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review. We excused the
Government from filing a brief and summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision.
In November 2011, Davidson filed another pro se motion for a two-level reduction
in sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In his motion, he argued that he was
entitled to a reduction under part A of retroactively applied Amendment 750, which
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altered the offense levels in § 2D1.1 relating to crack cocaine. He also claimed that the
District Court erred in considering one of his prior convictions (a state conviction for
possession with intent to deliver heroin) as a predicate offense for his career offender
designation. Lastly, he contended that under current law (specifically the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010) his crime would be classified differently and his sentencing guideline range
would change, so he would be entitled to a lower career offender sentence. Considering
Mateo and Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2688 (2010), which provided
guidance to district courts about reductions in sentences based on a retroactively
applicable Guidelines amendment, the District Court denied Davidson’s motion.
Davidson appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
review of a district court’s interpretation of the guidelines is plenary, while our review of
the ultimate decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(2) is for abuse of discretion. Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154. On review, we conclude
that the District Court did not err in denying Davidson’s motion.
The District Court followed the procedure outlined in Dillon. Namely, a court
must first determine if a sentence reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it
considers whether an authorized reduction is warranted. Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691. As
the District Court concluded, a sentence reduction based on Amendment 750 was not
consistent with the policy of § 1B1.10 because that provision disallows a reduction where
Amendment 750 “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). As in Davidson’s earlier attempt to
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reduce his sentence, the rationale of Mateo bars his claim (including the arguments he
repeats). See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155; see also United States v. Thompson, --- F.3d ---,
No. 11-4120, 2012 WL 2308099, at *5 (3d Cir. Jun. 19, 2012). Like Amendment 706,
Amendment 750 has no effect on his offense level, which was based on his designation as
a career offender. Accordingly, it is not a basis for a reduction of sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2).
Furthermore, in his § 3582(c)(2) motion, Davidson could not bring his challenge
to his classification of a career offender (based on his argument that one of his prior
convictions did not qualify as a predicate offenses for the career offender designation). It
simply is not the type of claim intended to be brought under the statutory provision. See
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Also, Davidson was not entitled to a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2)
based on his argument that his offense level as a career offender was reduced by the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 when it altered the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses.
Davidson contends that the statutory penalty for the crime on which the calculation of his
offense level as a career offender was based has been lowered by the Fair Sentencing Act.
However, the Fair Sentencing Act’s change to the statutory penalties for crack cocaine
offenses does not apply retroactively to defendants who committed their crimes and were
sentenced before its enactment. See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 113-15 (3d
Cir. 2010); see also Dorsey v. United States, No. 11-5683, --- U.S. ---, 2012 WL
2344463, at *14 (U.S. 2012) (summarizing that the ordinary practice in federal
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sentencing “is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding
that change from defendants already sentenced”). Accordingly, any difference in the
penalty cannot change Davidson’s offense level and cannot serve as a guideline change
that is a basis for a reduction of his sentence under § 3582(c)(2).
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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